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Abstract The fact that the emergence of ‘‘technoscience,’’ resulting from the
coalescing of science and technology, may have serious social and cultural impact
has been debated in recent years particularly with regard to the ﬁeld of medicine.
The present article is exploring the scope and limits of the ‘‘technoscientization’’ of
medicine using the example of rare disease patient associations. It is investigated
whether and to what extent these organizations adopt technoscientiﬁc illness
identities and subscribe to the research priorities and objectives of biomedicine. In
addition, it is analyzed whether Paul Rabinow’s highly inﬂuential concept of bi-
osociality entails a technoscientiﬁc model of identity or, quite to the contrary, offers
a framework for contesting biomedical ascriptions of identities. As the article
shows, patient associations do refer to technoscientiﬁc deﬁnitions of diseases yet
constantly modify and transform them based on their everyday illness experiences.
Likewise, the ‘‘biosociality’’ of rare disease patients emerges from the shared
experience of having been neglected by mainstream medical research rather than
from supposedly objective biomedical classiﬁcations.
Re ´sume ´ Le fait que l’e ´mergence de la ‘technoscience’ re ´sultant de la coalescence
de la science et de la technologie puisse avoir un impact social et culturel important
a fait l’objet d’un de ´bat important dans les dernie `res anne ´es en particulier dans le
domaine de la me ´decine. Le pre ´sent article explore l’e ´tendue et les limites de la
‘technoscientisation’ de la me ´decine en prenant l’exemple d’associations de patient
atteints de maladies rares. L’article investigue si et dans quelle mesure ces asso-
ciations adoptent des identite ´s de maladies technoscientiﬁques et souscrivent aux
priorite ´s de recherche et aux objectifs de la biome ´decine. De plus, l’article analyse
si le concept hautement inﬂuent de biosocialite ´ de Paul Rabinow comporte un
mode `le technoscientiﬁque d’identite ´ ou si, au contraire, il offre un cadre pour
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associations de patient re ´fe `rent effectivement a ` des de ´ﬁnitions technoscientiﬁques
des maladies, cependant elles les modiﬁent et les transforment constamment sur la
base de leur expe ´rience quotidienne des maladies. De me ˆme, la ‘biosocialite ´’ des
patients atteints de maladies rares e ´merge de l’expe ´rience partage ´e d’avoir e ´te ´
de ´laisse ´ par le courant dominant de la recherche me ´dicale pluto ˆt que de classiﬁ-
cations biome ´dicales suppose ´ment objectives.
Zusammenfassung Dass die zunehmende Verschmelzung von Wissenschaft und
Technik zur ,,Technowissenschaft‘‘erhebliche soziale und kulturelle Auswirkungen
haben kann, wird seit einigen Jahren vor allem mit Blick auf die Medizin lebhaft
diskutiert. Der Beitrag untersucht die Reichweite sowie die Grenzen einer techno-
wissenschaftlichen Transformation (,,technoscientization‘‘) der Medizin am Bei-
spiel von Patientenvereinigungen im Bereich der Seltenen Erkrankungen. Gefragt
wird insbesondere danach, inwieweit diese Organisationen technowissenschaftliche
Krankheitsidentita ¨ten u ¨bernehmen und sich die Forschungspriorita ¨ten und -ziele der
Biomedizin zu eigen machen. Analysiert wird außerdem, ob der in den Sozial-
wissenschaften sehr einﬂussreiche, von Paul Rabinow gepra ¨gte Begriff der Bio-
sozialita ¨t ein technowissenschaftliches Identita ¨tsmodell entha ¨lt oder, im Gegenteil,
einen Ansatzpunkt zur U ¨berwindung biomedizinischer Identita ¨tszuschreibungen
bietet. Der Artikel verdeutlicht, dass die Patientenorganisationen technowissen-
schaftliche Krankheitsdeﬁnitionen zwar aufgreifen, diese aber immer wieder durch
lebensweltliche Erfahrungen modiﬁzieren und transformieren. Ebenso gru ¨ndet sich
die ,,Biosozialita ¨t‘‘von Patienten mit Seltenen Erkrankungen eher auf die geteilte
Erfahrung langja ¨hriger Vernachla ¨ssigung durch die etablierte medizinische For-
schung als auf vermeintlich objektive biomedizinische Kriterien.
1 Introduction
The emergence of technoscience is frequently understood as an epistemologically
relevant trend toward increasingly close interactions of science and technology
within processes of knowledge production as well as a shift of scientiﬁc interest
toward the successful manipulation and ‘‘creation’’ of objects and artifacts.
However, the formation of technoscience can also be seen as a socially and
culturally signiﬁcant phenomenon, in that the interrelated co-construction of
scientiﬁc rationalities and technological devices has an enormous potential to shape
and transform social practices, relations, and identities. One important ﬁeld where
this transformative potential of technoscience has been emphasized and vividly
debated in recent years is medicine and health care (see for instance Clarke et al.
2003, 2009, 2010a; Burri and Dumit 2007; Gibbon and Novas 2008; Kollek and
Lemke 2008; Mol 2008; Sulik 2009, 2011; Mathar 2010). In this article, I will
therefore concentrate on the ﬁeld of medicine and explore to what extent and with
what consequences we can observe there what some authors have termed a process
of ‘‘technoscientization’’ (Clarke et al. 2003, 2010b), that is, the transformation of
medicine into a ﬁeld a technoscientiﬁc practices.
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limits of ‘‘technoscientization’’ since it has never simply been a ﬁeld of ‘‘applied
science’’ or ‘‘applied technology.’’ In spite of the undeniable scientization of
medicine and the growing importance of medical technologies during the last
decades, it has never ceased to be an experience-based social practice, a practice
that is not only rooted in the professional experience of doctors but also in the
personal and bodily illness experiences of the patients. Thus, it is an important
question to ask whether these experiences and the related social identities are
actually transformed into ‘‘technoscientiﬁc identities’’ as Clarke and co-authors
argue (Clarke et al. 2003), that is, identities that are primarily based on scientiﬁc
classiﬁcations (such as persons genetically ‘‘at risk’’) and corresponding techno-
logical procedures (e.g., genetic testing, genome sequencing, or neuroimaging).
Therefore, in order to probe the signiﬁcance as well as the possible limits of the
concept of technoscience as applied to the ﬁeld of medicine, I will examine whether
or not there is evidence of the more or less subtle inscription of technoscientiﬁc
identities or ‘‘technoscientiﬁc illness identities’’ (Sulik 2009, 2011) on patients and
their families, in particular on rare disease patients and their organizations.
1 The
article thus aims at investigating to what extent technoscientiﬁc illness identities are
adopted or modiﬁed or rejected by these organizations in their discourses and
practices. I consider this an illuminating empirical example since in social science
research, patient associations are frequently linked with questions of identity
formation.
2 In addition, many rare disease patient organizations are on the one hand
engaged in advocating and funding biomedical, frequently genetic, research into the
causes and possible therapies of ‘‘their’’ diseases. One could presume, therefore, that
this might make them receptive to the adoption of technoscientiﬁc deﬁnitions of
their conditions. On the other hand, being self-help groups of affected persons or
their parents, they are confronted with everyday experiences of illness that often
require better health care and unspectacular symptomatic therapies which usually
are beyond the interests of technoscientiﬁc biomedical and genetic research.
Furthermore, fears of genetic discrimination or the rise of new eugenic practices
have not entirely disappeared among rare disease patients and their relatives
(Taussig et al. 2003; Lemke 2006). These facts might render patient organizations
skeptical of or even resistant to biomedical knowledge claims. It comes as no
surprise that such a focus on the illness identities of rare disease patients and their
associations also touches on the highly inﬂuential concept of ‘‘biosociality,’’
introduced by Paul Rabinow (1996) during the 1990s. With this term, Rabinow
refers to new kinds of social groups and communities which form around a certain
1 ‘‘Rare disease’’ is merely a statistical classiﬁcation (see Huyard 2009a on the history of the concept of
‘‘rare diseases’’). Within the EU, a rare disease is deﬁned as one by which no more than 5 in 10,000
persons are affected. In principle, these diseases have little or even nothing in common with respect to
etiology, symptoms, or therapies, although many of them, yet not all, have a genetic origin, appear during
childhood, and take a lethal course. However, the term ‘‘rare disease’’ should not hide the fact that, with
an estimated number of 5,000–7,000 rare diseases, about 30 million people are affected only in the EU.
2 See for instance Callon and Rabeharisoa (2003), Novas (2007), and Langstrup (2011). The
interrelations of genetic medicine and emerging new identities are investigated more generally in
Atkinson et al. (2007).
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biosociality plays a remarkably ambivalent and contested role in current
discussions on biomedicine and technoscience: While for some authors, such as
Clarke et al. 2003, biosociality is an essentially technoscientiﬁc concept promoting
the adoption of technoscientiﬁc identities, for other scholars (e.g., Rose 2007), it
rather seems to indicate that biomedical knowledges and practices can success-
fully be transformed and acculturated by ‘‘biosocial’’ groups such as patient
associations.
In what follows, I would, ﬁrst, like to very brieﬂy sketch what might be
understood by the terms ‘‘technoscientization’’ of medicine and ‘‘technoscientiﬁc
identity’’ referring mainly to a widely received paper published in 2003 by the
American sociologists Adele Clarke and colleagues. Then I will address the
complex relationships between biomedicine and rare disease patient organizations
as well as the ambivalent role the concept of biosociality plays in this context.
Subsequently, drawing on preliminary results of current research at the University
of Augsburg as well as on empirical work done by other authors, I will illustrate
how rare disease patient associations deal with biomedical knowledge and whether
or not they adopt technoscientiﬁc illness identities. Finally, I will draw some
conclusions referring to the reach of the concept of technoscience in the ﬁeld of
medicine as well as to the ambiguities of the concept of biosociality.
2 Biomedicine as technoscience: inscribing technoscientiﬁc illness identities?
In their already mentioned paper, Adele Clarke and co-authors understand the
‘‘technoscientization’’ of medicine as one of ﬁve key processes of what they phrase
the ‘‘biomedicalization’’ of health and illness (Clarke et al. 2003).
3 In general, they
see this process of technoscientization as ‘‘part of major shifts in the social
organization of biomedicine itself, the objects of biomedical knowledge production,
the ways in which biomedicine intervenes, and the objectives with which it does so’’
(Clarke et al. 2003: 173). More precisely, technoscientization can be characterized
by the fact that biomedical innovations are ‘‘increasingly likely to be hybrid ones
that are generated simultaneously through sciences and technologies and new social
forms’’ (ibid.—original emphasis). A more recent deﬁnition is quite similar; here,
the authors speak of the ‘‘technoscientization of biomedical practices where
interventions for treatment and enhancement are progressively more reliant on
sciences and technologies, are conceived in those very terms, and are ever more
promptly applied’’ (Clarke et al. 2010b: 2).
4 Clarke et al. (2003: 173) describe
3 See for more recent accounts Clarke et al. 2009 and Clarke et al. 2010b. The 2003 paper has been
reprinted as a chapter in Clarke et al. 2010a. By the term ‘‘biomedicalization,’’ these authors understand a
new, intensiﬁed, and technoscientiﬁcally transformed shape of medicalization (Clarke et al. 2003: 162).
Medicalization, in turn, is usually conceived of as a process by which previously non-medical phenomena
are deﬁned in medical terms and treated with a medical intervention (see Conrad 2007: 5).
4 Basically, the authors draw on Bruno Latour’s conception of technoscience and emphasize that
‘‘science and technology are not easily distinguishable (…) but should instead be understood as co-
constituted and hybrid’’ (Clarke et al. 2010b: 42, n. 1).
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computerization and data banking, second molecularization and geneticization of
biomedicine and drug design, and third, medical technology design, development
and distribution, as for instance the design of new kinds of implants. The authors
sum up that the ongoing technoscientization in these three areas ‘‘is at the heart of
biomedicalization’’ (ibid.: 176).
Another one of the ﬁve basic processes of biomedicalization is characterized by
Clarke et al. as the ‘‘transformation of bodies and identities,’’ and particularly as
the construction of ‘‘new individual and collective technoscientiﬁc identities’’
(ibid.: 163).
5 By technoscientiﬁc identities, the authors understand ‘‘the new
genres of risk-based, genomics-based, epidemiology-based, and other techno-
science-based identities’’ (ibid.: 182). Such identities are ‘‘produced through the
application of sciences and technologies to our bodies directly and/or to our
histories or bodily products including images’’ (ibid.). As the authors add, these
new genres of identities, such as being carriers of genetic susceptibilities, are
‘‘frequently inscribed upon us, whether we like them or not’’ (ibid.). Again, Clarke
and colleagues list a number of more speciﬁc ways that technoscientiﬁc
biomedicine engages in processes of identity formation (ibid.: 182–183). The
ﬁrst one they mention is the use of technoscientiﬁc applications in order to attain
a desired, yet previously unavailable social identity, for instance becoming a
mother or father by means of reproductive technologies. Second, biomedicaliza-
tion imposes new mandates and performances to be incorporated into one’s sense
of self, for instance being proactive and prevention-conscious. The third trend
implies the creation of new categories of health-related identities and the
redeﬁnition of old ones through the use of biomedical techniques such as genetic
risk assessment. Thus, one’s identity can shift from ‘‘healthy’’ to ‘‘sick,’’ or from
‘‘low risk’’ to ‘‘high risk’’ and ostensibly being in need of speciﬁc biomedical
prevention (Fosket 2004, 2010). Fourthly, biomedicalization also enables ‘‘the
acquisition and performance of identities as patients and communities through
new technoscientiﬁc modes of interaction, such as telemedicine’’ (ibid.: 183; see
on this also Mathar 2010).
In a recent study, Gayle Sulik (2009) has developed the concept of a
‘‘technoscientiﬁc illness identity,’’ both drawing on the work of Clarke and
coauthors and reﬁning it. She describes a technoscientiﬁc illness identity as ‘‘a type
of illness identity that involves applying biomedical information and characteris-
tics to a persons’s sense of self (…). Rather than simply possessing a particular
biomedical marker or classiﬁcation, the person identiﬁes so strongly with it
that he or she integrates the classiﬁcation into his or her identity.’’ (Sulik
5 The other three basic processes of biomedicalization which I do not explicitly deal with here are, ﬁrst,
major political economic shifts resulting in a new biopolitical economy of medicine, health, illness,
living, and dying; second, a new focus on health (in addition to illness and disease) as well as on
optimization and enhancement and the development of risk and surveillance biomedicines; and third,
transformations of the production, distribution, and consumption of biomedical knowledges (cf. Clarke
et al. 2003: 166; Clarke et al. 2010b: 1–2). It becomes clear that there is much overlapping of the ﬁve
basic processes, and the demarcations between them are not always clear-cut, but I cannot elaborate on
this here (see for a partly different account of the current transformations of medicine Wehling and
Vieho ¨ver 2011).
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6 A person may, for instance, learn that she is genetically predisposed
to a particular medical condition; in this situation, adopting a technoscientiﬁc illness
identity means that this person begins ‘‘to think of herself as pre-diseased’’ (ibid.—
original emphasis) and act accordingly. The person does not only have a biomedical
classiﬁcation but tends to become this classiﬁcation (ibid.: 1060). Technoscientiﬁc
illness identities thus are not merely inscribed upon patients but are, at least to some
degree, accepted and actively adopted, if, probably, without fully realizing all of
their implications (see also Clarke et al. 2003: 183).
Of course, some of the features of the technoscientization of biomedicine listed
by Clarke et al. are debatable. Apart from the fact that the ﬁve key processes are
introduced rather unsystematically, there is, for instance, at least occasionally a
subtle and unacknowledged tendency toward a sort of technological determinism in
their argument. Nevertheless, I would like to use their description of technoscien-
tization as a heuristics, or as an ‘‘analytics’’ as the authors themselves suggest
(Clarke et al. 2010b: 26), in order to explore and assess the actual impact of
technoscientiﬁc biomedicine on rare disease patient associations’ practices and
identities. There can be little doubt that the ‘‘successful’’ imposition of individual or
collective technoscientiﬁc illness identities would be an important element of the
‘‘technoscientization’’ of contemporary societies. However, the scope and conse-
quences of such transformations of identities remain open to empirical research: As
Clarke and colleagues themselves emphasize, biomedicalization is not a ‘‘techno-
scientiﬁc tsunami that will obliterate prior practices and cultures’’ (Clarke et al.
2003: 184–185). They admit as well that the meanings of the emerging identities are
negotiated in heterogeneous ways (idid. 182).
7 Accordingly, in her qualitative study
on women diagnosed with breast cancer, Sulik found out that a technoscientiﬁc
illness identity has been adopted by no more than 27% of those women who used
medical information in order to understand their situation (Sulik 2009: 1064).
3 Biomedicine, rare disease patient organizations, and biosociality
Since the 1990s, many rare disease patient organizations which usually were
founded as self-help groups of patients and their relatives have started to engage
with scientiﬁc research into the causes and possible therapies of their respective
diseases (see Epstein 2008). The resulting interrelations of these organizations and
biomedicine are highly complex and not easy to describe. On the one hand, there is,
of course, considerable overlapping of the interests and objectives of patient
organizations and biomedicine. This holds true, ﬁrst and foremost, with respect to
biomedical research into the causes of disease and new therapeutical options. On the
other hand, however, there might also be tensions and ambivalences regarding, for
6 The concept of an ‘‘illness identity’’ has been developed by Kristin Barker (2002) using the example of
ﬁbromyalgia syndrome (FMS) patients. According to Barker (2002: 281–84), an illness identity is formed
when patients situate their personal experiences onto public illness narratives and simultaneously use
these narratives to understand themselves and their situations.
7 Therefore, at the end of their 2003 paper, they call for case studies ‘‘that attend to the heterogeneities of
biomedicalization practices and effects in different lived situations’’ (Clarke et al. 2003: 185).
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problems of genetic testing or prenatal diagnosis. In this section, I will brieﬂy
elaborate, ﬁrst, on these multifaceted interrelations of biomedical research and rare
disease patient organizations and, second, draw attention to the question of whether
and how the complexities of these interrelations are expressed in the concept of
biosociality. I will argue that the above-mentioned contrasting interpretations of this
concept originate, at least to some extent, from the fact that the ambivalent
relationships between biomedicine and patient organizations are mirrored in
ambiguities of the concept itself.
It is beyond any doubt that rare disease patient organizations have largely
beneﬁted and will continue to beneﬁt from biomedical research, particularly from
technoscientiﬁc genetic research (although not all rare diseases are associated with
genetic variations). Discovering the genes and gene variants that are held to be
responsible for a speciﬁc disease obviously can foster the scientiﬁc understanding of
the pathogenic mechanisms and give rise to hopes for new and effective therapies
(Novas 2007). The availability of a genetic test for the disease can put an end to the
horrible odysseys, familiar to rare disease patients and their parents, from one doctor
or clinic to the next one without receiving a reliable diagnosis. In addition, when
biomedicine reveals the fact that rare diseases, such as neurodegenerative diseases
or muscular dystrophies, are indeed diseases with biological causes, not erratic
defects that breed strange kinds of beings, it supports patients in their struggles for
social and medical recognition. Likewise, biomedicine can offer these patients new
collective identities and create opportunities for political mobilization and active
participation in research and research politics.
All these aspects have impressively been illustrated by Michel Callon and
Vololona Rabeharisoa referring to the example of the Association francaise contre
les myopathies (AFM), the French organization of muscular dystrophy (MD)
patients which is able to fund biomedical research with comparatively large
amounts of money: ‘‘In 1950 MD patients were excluded from common humanity;
30 years later they were considered as human beings in their own right. They had
crossed the border, back into the realm of human beings, where they were simply
singularized by a few genetic particularities. In the late 1950s they were
undifferentiated MD patients; since the 1980s they have been unfortunate human
beings affected by a particular disease, generally monogenetic, which explains why
their bodies are so dramatically crippled and why they die earlier than other people.
Uncertainties remain, especially on the possibility of preventing diseases and of
ﬁnding therapies quickly. But many facts have been produced that make it possible
to deﬁne options and to elaborate strategies. Professional networks—researchers,
doctors, occupational therapists, and care ofﬁcers—have been established, and
patients with their families have formed groups to work together.’’ (Callon and
Rabeharisoa 2008: 234–235—original emphasis).
As these authors summarize, MD patients have gone ‘‘from a situation of passive
exclusion to one of active inclusion’’ (ibid.: 235), not least with the support of
biomedical, genetic research. More speciﬁcally, the AFM in its overall strategy
followed both a ‘‘path to cure’’ and a ‘‘path to citizenship’’; on the path to cure, it
adopted a ‘‘genetic identity’’ which helped it to engage in biomedical research and
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another paper, the authors even ascribe a ‘‘civilizing’’ effect to ‘‘the gene’’
(understood as an ‘‘actant’’ in the actor-network-theory terminology) (Callon and
Rabeharisoa 2003: 201): ‘‘By showing that a defect is in fact a small genetic
accident, the AFM demonstrates that we are all just one or two genes away from
being MD patients. Genes are not content just to make particular and general
interests compatible; they also produce solidarity and compassion.’’ (Ibid.: 200).
8
Another example of a patient association that successfully collaborates with
biomedical research and even became a research organization itself is PXE
International, an advocacy organization which initiates, funds, and conducts
research on pseudoxanthoma elasticum (PXE), a rare genetic disorder that causes
vision, skin, and arterial defects (Terry et al. 2007; see also Novas 2007). PXE
International did not only fund biomedical research that, in 2000, was successful in
identifying the genetic mutations associated with PXE; in addition, the founders of
the organization, Sharon and Patrick Terry, themselves participated in this research
and therefore are named as co-inventors on the patent for the discovered gene. They
assigned their rights to the foundation, as did the scientists who had been involved
in identifying the gene (Terry et al. 2007: 161). In addition, PXE International
founded a blood and tissue bank, established a genetic test for the disease, funded
the development of an animal model, conducted clinical trials, and mentored other
rare disease advocacy groups (Terry et al. 2007).
Yet, despite these successful examples, there might also be a number of tensions
between biomedical research and rare disease patient organizations. Two of these
tensions are particularly important: First, genetic research up to now is far more
effective in identifying genes ‘‘causing’’ diseases and in developing diagnostic tests
than in ﬁnding new, promising therapies. As Aaron Panofsky has pointedly put it in
a recent paper, ‘‘Research supported by rare genetic disease PAOs [patient advocacy
organizations] has almost never achieved its ostensible goal of developing cures or
even effective treatments.’’ (Panofsky 2011: 34)
9 This holds, for instance, for the
case of cystic ﬁbrosis (CF): While the gene associated with the disease has been
discovered as early as 1989, there is still no cure available. Stockdale and Terry
(2002) have retrospectively criticized the US patient organization Cystic Fibrosis
Foundation (CFF) for its ‘‘narrow focus on ‘curing’ CF’’ by means of gene therapies
and for directing extensive resources almost exclusively to basic research during the
1990s. At the same time, they argue, ‘‘other issues, such as ready access to
affordable medications and care, receive less attention than they might warrant’’
(Stockdale and Terry 2002: 82). They add that this neglect applies to the difﬁcult
problems of genetic testing as well that had been raised by the discovery of the
8 This statement is, however, not unproblematic since in other contexts, ‘‘the gene’’ may have adverse
effects, for instance when individuals are stigmatized as ‘‘gene carriers’’ and exposed to the risk of genetic
discrimination (Lemke 2006). Apparently, these more critical, potentially excluding aspects of ‘‘genetic
identities’’ threaten to be underestimated as long as genetics research promises to provide cures for
hitherto incurable diseases.
9 For Panofsky, it is therefore a ‘‘fascinating question’’ why patient organizations are interested in genetic
research at all, ‘‘since diagnostic rather than therapeutic tools are the most likely near-term outcomes of
such research’’ (Panofsky 2011: 34; see also Langstrup 2011).
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10 In general, technoscientiﬁc biomedicine appears to be interested primarily in
basic research, while the aim of patient organizations clearly lies in what Terry et al.
(2007: 158) have termed ‘‘health outcomes’’ and ‘‘immediate translational beneﬁts.’’
These authors therefore argue that ‘‘research that has long-term beneﬁts for
understanding general disease mechanisms must be balanced with research that has
more immediate applications’’ (ibid.: 163; see also Stockdale and Terry 2002: 80).
At any rate, this is a potential source of tension or even conﬂict of interests between
biomedical research and rare disease patient organizations, particularly when we
take into account that patient organizations frequently lack appropriate means to
control what kind of research the scientists whom they fund actually do.
Second, the gap between diagnostics (frequently by means of genetic testing) on
the one hand and effective therapies on the other raises a number of new problems
and difﬁcult questions which are controversially debated within and among different
patient organizations. These problems include the creation of new categories of
people situated between health and illness, such as carriers of so-called suscepti-
bility genes with heightened disease risks or carriers of disease genes, so-called
heterozygotes, for instance healthy siblings of children affected by autosomal
recessive diseases. These persons who themselves are healthy but potentially carry
the deleterious gene might be confronted with calls for premarital testing or prenatal
testing of their children. Thus, the mismatch of diagnostics and therapies almost
inevitably moves the issue of prevention by means of genetic testing and screening
to the foreground. While some patient organizations, as for instance the Beyond
Batten Disease Foundation in the US, are advocating large-scale genetic screening
for rare diseases,
11 others such as ‘‘Little People of America’’ (LPA), a self-help
organization of people with achondroplasia, a form of heritable, single-gene
dwarﬁsm, are more reluctant to prenatal genetic testing fearing the proliferation of
eugenic practices (Taussig et al. 2003). Still other organizations appear to be
internally split with regard to these questions. Thus, at least some patient
organizations do not conform with technoscientiﬁc practices of reconﬁguring social
identities which, for the time being, imply a tacit shift from therapy to prevention.
How do these complex interrelations of biomedicine and patient organizations
become manifest in contradictory interpretations of the concept of biosociality—and
in what way do these interpretations mirror the ambiguities of the concept itself?
Remarkably, Clarke and her co-authors understand biosociality as ‘‘the major
framing of technoscientiﬁc identities’’ (Clarke et al. 2003: 183), as a new mode of
social relations ‘‘deeply linked’’ to living with such identities (Clarke et al. 2009:
23). With regard to disability activists, Bill Hughes similarly criticizes those groups
who understand themselves as biological citizens or biosocial groups for embracing
a ‘‘medicalised concept of self-identity’’ as well as for sharing a questionable
‘‘optimism about the beneﬁts of technology and medical science’’ (Hughes 2009:
10 For a more detailed account of the search for gene therapy for CF and its shortcomings, see Wailoo
and Pemberton (2006: 61–115).
11 Batten disease is a fatal neurodegenerative disease that appears during childhood. The Beyond Batten
Disease Foundation currently is supporting research to develop a single, easy, and inexpensive blood test
to detect the gene mutations for hundreds of rare diseases, particularly autosomal recessive diseases such
as Batten disease (http://www.beyondbatten.org/about-prevention.html, last access 10.9.2011).
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camp that is advocating a social model of disability and another (‘‘biosocial’’) camp
that is adopting biomedical models of disability and disease (ibid.: 685). Such
critical understandings of biosociality seem to be not entirely unjustiﬁed, for
Rabinow himself has introduced the concept with a strong reference to communities
and identities which arise out of a biomedical classiﬁcation and refer to a speciﬁc
genetic condition, for instance ‘‘groups formed around the chromosome 17, locus
16,256, site 654,376 allele variant with a guanine substitution’’ (Rabinow 1996:
102). Nevertheless, the characterization of biosociality as deeply linked to
questionable technoscientiﬁc identities contrasts with a widespread view which
understands it primarily as the basis for creating new forms of collective action, as
an empowerment of patients and/or their parents, especially with regard to their
interactions with biomedicine. Rose (2007: 144–147), for instance, conceives of
biosociality in terms of making claims for ‘‘active biological citizenship’’ and of lay
actors’ participation in the cooperative production of medical knowledge. In
particular, patient organizations are credited in recent social science research with
the ability not only to contribute to the creation of novel forms of knowledge and
social relations but also to escape the imposition of technoscientiﬁc identities.
These diverging interpretations point to an underlying ambiguity of the concept
itself, for it leaves open whether biosocial groups are held to simply arise out of
supposedly objective biological or genetic conditions (‘‘the chromosome 17, locus
16,256, site 654,376 allele variant with a guanine substitution’’) with which they
identify and to which they try to adjust their lives. Such a reading is at least partly
supported by Rabinow himself when he writes that biosocial groups ‘‘will have
medical specialists, laboratories, narratives, traditions, and a heavy panoply of
pastoral keepers to help them experience, share, intervene, and ‘understand’ their
fate’’ (Rabinow 1996: 102). Or do these groups, quite to the contrary, constitute
themselves by re-deﬁning the ostensibly given biological basis of their identities
thus creating truly biosocial identities and possibly questioning biomedical
knowledge claims? This interpretation, too, can draw upon Rabinow’s consider-
ations, for instance when he contrasts biosociality with (‘‘biologistic’’) sociobiol-
ogy: ‘‘If sociobiology is culture constructed on the basis of a metaphor of nature,
then in biosociality nature will be modeled on culture understood as practice.’’
(Ibid.: 99). Thus, while the concept of biosociality itself might, in principle, be open
to both interpretations, in recent social science discussions, it has frequently been
narrowed to the idea of ﬁxed biological identities which are deﬁned by biomedicine
and held to form a stable basis on which biosocial groups (e.g., patient
organizations) operate.
12 Understood in this way, biosociality is indeed a ‘‘framing
of technoscientiﬁc identities’’; however, in the following sections, I will explore
whether or not there are possibilities to conceive of the concept in different, less
deterministic ways.
12 See for more detailed criticisms of this narrow understanding of biosociality Lemke and Wehling
2009; Lemke 2010; Wehling 2011.
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1234 Rare disease patient associations and technoscientiﬁc illness identities
How do rare disease patient organizations deal with biomedical knowledge claims
and technoscientiﬁc illness identities? In this section, I will focus on two aspects
which appear to be illuminating with regard to these questions: ﬁrst, the issues of
research priorities and research funding and second, those of illness experiences and
identities of the patient organizations and/or their members.
One important impact that biomedicine doubtlessly has on rare disease patient
associations, at least on those concerned with supposedly genetic diseases, is what
Clarke et al. (2003: 182) have termed the ‘‘creation of new categories of health-
related identities and the redeﬁnition of old ones.’’ Since the 1990s, in the context of
Human Genome Research, for many rare diseases, the genes or the gene variants
held to be causally responsible have been identiﬁed. As a consequence, these
diseases were no longer conceived as incurable ones but redeﬁned, according to the
promises of biomedicine, as potentially or even probably curable ones by genetic or
some other sort of therapy (Novas 2007: 11). This shift is anything but trivial, since
it constructs or ‘‘interpellates,’’ as Langstrup (2011) puts it referring to the French
philosopher Louis Althusser, rare disease patients (and their organizations) as future
users of potentially new biomedical therapies and thus transforms both their social
and illness identities. Many researchers as well as representatives of patient groups
believed after the discovery of ‘‘the gene for’’ their illness that therapy seemed to be
‘‘just around the corner’’ (see Stockdale 1999). Nevertheless, this shift from
incurable to supposedly curable diseases has been utterly important for rare disease
patient organizations since it offered them opportunities for meaningful participa-
tion in biomedical research with the aim to ﬁnd therapies for their respective
diseases. In reaction to the promise of novel, effective cures, many patient
associations started to support or intensiﬁed their support for biomedical research
concentrating primarily on basic research.
However, although there are various reasons to consider this development a
positive achievement, it still remains an open question to what extent rare disease
patient organizations do (and should) subscribe to the objectives, research agendas,
and interests of technoscientiﬁc biomedicine. As already mentioned, some scholars
have warned patient organizations against too readily buying into the ‘‘popular
dream of breakthrough medicine’’ (Wailoo and Pemberton 2006: 168; see also
Stockdale and Terry 2002) because this might distract their attention from other
important tasks concerning symptomatic therapies and health care.
13 To put it
differently, is it sufﬁcient for rare disease patient organizations simply to focus on
the acceleration of science, as Carlos Novas (2007: 17) argues, or should they also
be concerned with realigning medical research toward paying more attention to
scientiﬁcally perhaps unattractive, yet therapeutically valuable short- or middle-
term beneﬁts for those who are currently affected by the disease?
13 As Keith Wailoo and Stephen Pemberton argue, the ‘‘genetics revolution’’ up to now has ‘‘most
transformed society in the areas of diagnosis and prevention. Therapy continues to be a vexing challenge.
If the promise of breakthrough cures has often been unrealized, a large part of the problem is rooted in the
stubborn asymmetries between scientiﬁc and technological models of disease and how bodies actually
work.’’ (Wailoo and Pemberton 2006: 168).
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14 the impact that the
‘‘gene hype’’ of the 1990s had at least on some patient associations subsequently
has been replaced by a more nuanced and skeptical view. As one of our
interview partners from a German patient organization has put it, ‘‘The idea, that
I correct the defective gene and everything is ﬁne, is deﬁnitely over.’’ Instead,
research that is funded by rare disease patient associations today is directed to
gradual improvements of symptomatic therapies and health-care practices no less
than to basic genetic research. Thus, with regard to research priorities and more
general attitudes toward the diseases, the strong inﬂuence that technoscientiﬁc
biomedicine exerted on some rare disease patient groups during the 1990s and
early 2000s appears to be a temporal phenomenon rather than a stable long-term
trend (see on this also Sect. 5). However, the extent to which rare disease patient
organizations refrain from the promises of genetic medicine seems to depend on
the characteristics of the respective disease as well as on the organizational
structure of the groups. As to the ﬁrst aspect, it is clear that the vision of
‘‘repairing’’ the faulty gene is more compelling when the disease takes a rapid
and unstoppable lethal course than when the patients still have a life expectancy
of 20 or more years after onset of the disease. As regards the organizational
structures, it seems that those associations that understand themselves and act
mainly as self-help groups or are closely tied to self-help groups are more
reluctant to adopt biomedical views and promises than organizations (e.g.,
foundations) whose aim is primarily or even exclusively to fund and promote
medical research.
Nevertheless, beyond the question of research funding and research priorities,
molecularization and geneticization, which have been identiﬁed by Clarke and
colleagues as one of three key elements of the technoscientization of medicine,
doubtlessly exert considerable inﬂuence on the understanding of disease in patient
associations. For instance, classiﬁcations of the respective diseases and of the
patients along diverse variants of the ‘‘gene defect’’ are quite usual. Yet the practical
impact on patients’ illness identities of such biomedical knowledge claims often
seems to be rather limited or is even limiting itself by producing paradoxical effects.
In this respect, I would like to emphasize two aspects: First, the members of patient
organizations frequently observe that there are only weak and uncertain links
between genotypes and phenotypes. One of our interview partners, the founder of a
very small German patient association, gave the example of a family having two
children, a boy and a girl, with exactly the same genetic variants associated with the
disease. But while the boy died at the age of 10, his sister, though affected by the
disease, was still alive and comparatively well. Thus, even when rare disease patient
associations and their members adopt a ‘‘genetic’’ illness identity, it often is a
14 The research project ‘‘Participatory Governance of Science’’ is conducted at the University of
Augsburg and funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) from 2009 to
2012. It focuses on the role of civil society organizations such as environmental and consumer
organizations, health movements, or patient associations in the governance of science and technology. In
this context, we conducted interviews with leading representatives of several German rare disease patient
associations ranging from ‘‘classical’’ self-help groups to research-oriented foundations. Since the project
is not yet completed, the ﬁndings referred to in this article are necessarily preliminary ones.
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15 To put
it differently, although the patients have a genetic classiﬁcation, they do not
necessarily become this classiﬁcation (Sulik 2009), since the lived experience of
illness does not always correspond to such genotype-related classiﬁcations.
The second aspect that is worth mentioning in this context is important with
regard to the concept of biosociality as well: Even conditions by which only very
few persons are affected often differentiate into several genetic variations with
speciﬁc therapies being required for each of these subtypes. As an interview partner
mentioned, this may result in difﬁcult constellations within the patient organizations
when, for instance, there appear to be better chances to develop therapies for a
speciﬁc subtype than for others. Thus, biomedical research that continues to
fragment the genetic basis of diseases into various subtypes is likely to confront the
patient associations with problems of identity, cohesion, and solidarity. At the same
time, it tends to undermine the idea that technoscientiﬁc knowledge would produce
an objective and stable basis for building new forms of biosocial identities. As it
seems, many patient groups, again, react to such challenges by adhering to more
phenotype-based conceptions of the disease. In addition, solidarity among the group
members frequently is built on the common social experience of having been
neglected by the mainstream of medical research as well as on the joint efforts to
change this situation rather than on shared biological traits (see also Huyard
2009b).
16 This might be one of the main reasons why umbrella organizations such
as the German ACHSE (Allianz Chronischer Seltener Erkrankungen) covering a
broad range of heterogeneous rare diseases appear to be quite successful in
promoting among its member organizations a shared social and political identity of
‘‘being rare.’’
5 Conclusions: the limits to technoscientization
Apparently, the interrelations of biomedicine, technoscience, and rare disease
patient organizations are too complex and heterogeneous that one could reasonably
speak of an unambiguous trend toward the ‘‘technoscientization’’ of social identities
and practices in this medical ﬁeld.
17 Although the impact of biomedicine on rare
disease patient associations should by no means be underestimated, the formation of
technoscientiﬁc illness identities in the strict meaning suggested by Sulik (2009)
seems to be not very common among these organizations’ representatives or
15 See for similar ﬁndings with regard to haematochromatosis the study by Bharadwaj et al. 2007.I n
addition, testing for genotypes can itself generate new uncertainties, as is the case with Huntington’s
disease where genetic testing creates so-called ‘‘intermediate’’ persons who may or may not develop the
disease (cf. Lemke 2004: 33–35).
16 Similarly, based on his study on rare disease patient advocacy organizations, Panofsky (2011: 39) is
questioning the assumption that ‘‘the active assertion of a positive disease identity’’ is a strong part of
these organizations’ strategies of promoting research.
17 This result does, however, not preclude the possibility of ‘‘successful’’ technoscientization in other
medical areas. Mathar (2010), for instance, investigates the technoscientization of health care by
telemedicine and telemonitoring of patients but points to the limits to such efforts as well.
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their diseases, they rarely identify so strongly with these classiﬁcations that they
would integrate them into their own identities or those of their affected children.
One of the main reasons for this reservation can be seen in the fact that biomedical
and genotypical classiﬁcations frequently do not match the lived experiences of
illnesses and their (‘‘phenotypical’’) peculiarities and uncertainties. In addition,
since genetics-based research to date has largely failed to provide effective
therapies, the attention of many rare disease patient organizations has shifted from
the promises of future ‘‘breakthrough cures’’ (back) to more immediate ‘‘health
outcomes,’’ as Terry et al. (2007) have put it. Quite similarly, Henriette Langstrup
(2011) has shown in her study on associations of patients suffering from more
widespread diseases, such as diabetes, multiple sclerosis, Parkinson’s, or Alzhei-
mer’s, that only few of these organizations responded positively to being
‘‘interpellated’’ as future users of stem cell technologies and therapies. Other
associations, by contrast, considered it irresponsible to raise among their members
unrealistic hopes for cure and therefore rejected the suggested identity of future
users of stem cell technologies and did not support this strand of research
(Langstrup 2011: 585f.).
Asregardsthecontestedconceptofbiosociality,itwouldbeoverstatedtomaintain
that it is technoscientiﬁc in itself. It is, however, an ambiguous concept which leaves
room for contradictory interpretations, as shown in Sect. 3. In any case, the formation
of biosocial groups and identities is not so straightforward as Rabinow’s initial
account might suggest, according to which biosocial collectives and identities simply
emerge around a shared biomedical classiﬁcation and genetic condition. Instead, it is
subject to negotiation and contestation what the ‘‘biological’’ in biosociality actually
means (see Wehling 2011); the same applies, of course, to the ‘‘social’’ which does
not represent a ﬁx and taken-for-granted identity either. Biosociality should therefore
be conceived in the ﬁrst place as a social context in which conceptions of health,
disease and biology as well as social and illness identities are negotiated, both
inﬂuenced by biomedicine and possibly resistant to it.
18
In a recent reﬂection on the (short) history of the concept of biosociality,
Rabinow himself pointed to the fact that both the concept and the hopes directed to
technoscientiﬁc biomedicine, in particular to the mapping of the human genome,
were inﬂuenced by the enthusiastic climate of the 1990s which he retrospectively
termed the ‘‘Golden Age of Molecular Biosociality’’: ‘‘There was hope, there was
progress, there was a reason to be urgent even strident—there were reasons to want
to be biosocial.’’ (Rabinow 2008: 190) According to Rabinow, that decade has been
a formative period ‘‘when technology-driven advances in understanding were
undeniable—a moment when it still seemed legitimate to have hope for dramatic,
even deﬁnitive, diagnostic and therapeutic triumphs’’ (ibid.). Obviously, such hopes
pinned on biomedicine and biosociality have at best partly been realized. As
Rabinow admits, ‘‘the hopes and hype of the genomic decade have failed to provide
18 The term ‘‘resistant biosociality’’ has been coined by Taussig et al. (2003: 66) with a view to the
opposition to prenatal genetic testing for ‘‘dwarﬁsm’’ of ‘‘Little People of America’’, a rare disease patient
association. This opposition has been driven mainly by fear of the emergence of eugenic practices.
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123adequate diagnostic or risk assessment tools or treatments based on them’’ (ibid.:
192). Thus, he adds that some of the limits of the concept of biosociality can now be
seen ‘‘with more clarity’’; it should therefore be understood as a heuristic tool rather
than as ‘‘an epochal designation meant to characterize an age or era’’ (ibid.: 191).
Hence, it might now be the right moment to analytically separate this concept from
the historical context in which it has been coined and by which it has been shaped
and to rethink it in order to investigate the complex and ambiguous relationships of
biomedicine, illness identities, and patient associations under changing
circumstances.
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